Concrete Products Company, division of Gibbons and Reed, a corporation v. Salt Lake County, a body politic : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1991
Concrete Products Company, division of Gibbons
and Reed, a corporation v. Salt Lake County, a body
politic : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gerald E. Nielson; Deputy County Attorney; Attorney for Appellant.
Bryce E. Roe; Valden P. Livingston; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Concrete Products Company v. Salt Lake County, No. 919771.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3938
9ttjk2L IN THE SUPREME COURT 
•—• OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CONCRETE PRODUCTS COMPANY, 
division of Gibbons & Reed, 
a corporation. 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
politic, 
Defendant and Appellant 
No. 19771 
REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal From The Judgment Of The 
Third District Court for Salt Lake County 
Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge 
GERALD E. NIELSON 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
BRYCE E. ROE 
215 South 
Salt Lake 
VALDEN P. 
185 South 
Salt Lake 
State Street 
City, Utah 84111 
LIVINGSTON 
State Street 
City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
JAN 81987 
Clerk, Supreme Court. Utah" 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CONCRETE PRODUCTS COMPANY, 
division of Gibbons & Reed, 
a corporation. 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
politic. 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 19771 
REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal From The Judgment Of The 
Third District Court for Salt Lake County-
Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge 
BRYCE E. ROE 
215 South State 
Salt Lake City, 
VALDEN P. 
185 South 
Salt Lake 
Street 
Utah 84111 
LIVINGSTON 
State Street 
City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
GERALD E. NIELSON 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . 1 
T. RESPONDENTS HAVE MISCONSTRUED THE HOLDING 
IN THE CASE OF BREITLING BROTHERS V. UTAH 
GOLDEN SPIKERS INC. CONCERNING THE APPLI-
CABILITY OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §14-1-5 
WHERE NO CONTRACT IS AWARDED BY A GOVERN-
MENTAL ENTITY 1 
II. THERE WAS NO PUBLIC WORK OR IMPROVEMENT 
BECAUSE THE COUNTY WAS NOT THE OWNER OF 
THE PROPERTY WHEN THE ALLEGED CONTRACT WAS 
MADE 4 
III. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ON 
THE BASIS OF "UNJUST ENRICHMENT" BECAUSE 
THE COUNTY WAS NOT ENRICHED 6 
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THAT IT IS ENTITLED 
TO ATTORNEY'S FEES BUT THE COUNTY IS NOT, 
IS SPECIOUS 8 
CONCLUSION 9 
CASES CITED 
Breitling Bros. Construction, Inc. v. uidh Golden 
Spikers, Inc. and the State of Utah, 547 -- 2d 
869 (1979) . . • 1. 
Nowak v. Nowak, 394 A,2d 7lh . 5 
Seegers V- Sprague. 2<*> w W (19/b). . . . . . 7 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann.. Sec. 14-1-5 2. 
5. 
Utah Code Ann.. Sec. 14-1-7. 3 
IH. .ah '.'ode Ann.. Sec. 14-1-8 8 
Utah Code Ann.. Sec. 17-15-3 3 
Utah Code Ann., Sec. 27-12-108.1 - 8 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(continued) 
Page 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, 
Sec. 66.05 6 
62 ALR3d 288 7 
- ii -
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CONCRETE PRODUCTS COMPANY, 
division of Gibbons & Reed, 
a corporation. 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
politic. 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 19771 
REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS HAVE MISCONSTRUED THE HOLDING IN 
THE CASE OF BREITLING BROTHERS V. UTAH GOLDEN 
SPIKERS INC. CONCERNING THE APPLICABILITY OF 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §14-1-5 WHERE NO CONTRACT 
IS AWARDED BY A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY. 
Respondent claims Breitlinq Brothers Construction Inc. v. 
Utah Golden Spikers. 597 P.2d 869 (1979), says: 
a. "the fact the governmental entity owning the 
property is not the one who supervises and awards the contract 
for the public improvement, does not discharge the governmental 
entities obligation to require a payment bond." 
b. "that if a valid lease—had been executed, the state 
would have been required to pay for the improvements." 
c. "There was no question that the improvements to the 
State Fair Grounds were within the purview of Utah Code Ann. 
§14-1-5 (1953)." 
The County urges that Breitling says none of those 
things; that Petitioner has read those things into the case 
because of its justified concern that in this case the County 
didn't contract with petitioner or with anyone. The County 
merely exercised its governmental discretion to approve a 
subdivider's request to accept its promise to install the 
improvements in question together with a performance bond to 
guarantee said promise. 
This court did say in Breitling: 
"for a contract to be "awarded" by the state, 
or other public institution, it must be entered 
into as a result of a decision by the governing 
board or other authority charged with that 
responsibility. In order that this may be 
accomplished and that the public interest may 
be properly safeguarded. Sec. 64-1-4, U.C.A. 
1953, proivdes that: 
Whenever the needs of a state 
institution...require...any work 
amounting to more that $1000 to be 
done, the governing board of such 
institution...shall advertise for at 
least 10 days in some newspaper... for 
sealed proposals for repairing or 
erecting such building, or performing 
such work, in accordance with plans 
and specification to be had at the 
office of the board. 
[4] There appear to be several reasons why the 
legislature has deemed it proper to enact 
statutes of this character. One of these is 
that the business of the public must be taken 
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care of by a succession of changing elected 
public officials, who have no personal interest 
at stake except their sense of duty; and that 
it is well known that they are subjected to 
many types of pressures and importunities for 
persons who would use various means of attempt-
ing to profit from the public treasury. The 
reguirement of public notice by advertising, 
and the acceptance of bids, serves to protect 
the public interest and taxpayers from any 
dealings in secrecy, or from officials showing 
favoritism or engaging in collusion with 
friends or political supporters, and from any 
ill considered, unnecessary, or extortionate 
contracts. If the required procedures are not 
adhered to, the salutary purpose of the statute 
could be defeat-ed by simply allowing parties to 
furnish materials or render services to the 
state, and then recover on the basis of 
estoppel or quantum meruit. It is for these 
reasons that it is quite universally held that 
in order to bind the state, the reguirments of 
the statute must be complied with; and that the 
usual rules of estoppel do not apply against it. 
In conformity with what has just been stated, 
we can see no basis whatsoever upon which to 
agree with the plaintiff's contention that it 
should be deemed that there was a contract with 
the state of Utah by which it was obliged to 
reguire Golden Spikers to furnish a bond to 
guarantee payment of laborers and materialmen, 
as reguired by Sec. 14-1-5, U.C.A. 1953." 
(emphasis added) 
The County, like the State, is required to award 
contracts by competitive bidding. The applicable statutes are 
U.C.A. 17-15-3 and U.C.A. 27-12-108.1. Competitive bidding is 
also required by the County's own ordinances. 
This court's definition of "awarded" is reinforced by 
Black's law dictionary's definition of "award", as follows: 
"AWARD. v. To grant, concede, or adjudge to. 
To give or assign by sentence or judicial 
determination. Hobson v. Superior Court of 
Tulhare County, 69 Cal.App. 60, 230 P. 456, 
457. Thus, a jury awards damages; the court 
awards an injunction. Starkey v. Minneapolis, 
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19 Minn. 206 (Gil. 166). One awards a contract 
to a bidder. Jackson v. State, 194 Ind. 130, 
142 N.E. 1, 2, (holding that a finding that a 
contract was "awarded to" a bidder meant it was 
entered into with all required legal 
formalities)." (Emphasis added). 
The county urges that there was no grant or concession in 
this case. On the contrary the subdivider received only a 
liability, the obligation to complete the improvements. 
The importance of Breitling as applied to this case is 
its holding that U.C.A. 14-1-5 required that the contract be 
"awarded" and its definition of "awarded" as the culmination of 
a competitive bidding process. 
There was of course no competitive bidding in this case. 
U.C.A. 14-1-5 and 7 were not applicable because there was 
no contract. If the court defines "contract" broadly to 
include the county's approval of the subdivider's promise, it 
cannot be said that such contract was "awarded". The 
legislature when it passed U.C.A. 14-1-5 and 7 did not intend 
to reach the county's approval of subdivision procedures. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO PUBLIC WORK OR IMPROVEMENT BECAUSE 
THE COUNTY WAS NOT THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY 
WHEN THE ALLEGED CONTRACT WAS MADE. 
The conduct which Petitioner calls a contract, the county 
characterizes as a mere approval of the subdivider's proposed 
promise to install improvements and a performance bond to 
guarantee that promise. The county will refer to that as the 
"alleged contract." In its brief. Plaintiff has noted the 
signing of the dedica-tion prior to the date of the "alleged 
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contract." It inferred thereby that the County was the owner 
of the property at the time of the alleged contract — but that 
is not the case. The stipulated facts clearly indicate that 
the County would not approve the plat until the alleged 
contract was accomplished. The County was in no sense an owner 
at the time of the alleged contract. 
Since the first three words of U.C.A. 14-1-5 "Before any 
contract" (emphasis added) precede and apply to the requirement 
of the payment bond, the alleged contract could not have been 
for a public work or improvement at the time it was 
accomplished because the County's ownership interest had not 
yet occurred. 
The County contends there was not a contract. Whether 
there is or not is at least ambiguous. The County contends 
that if there is a contract it is not for a public improvement 
because the public ownership came after the alleged contract. 
Whether there is a public contract is at least ambiguous. The 
County contends there is no awarding of a contract or at best 
that whether there is such is ambiguous. If the County is to 
be the recipient of vicarious liability, the statute imposing 
that liability ought to give clear warning of that risk. As 
the court in Nowak v. Nowak, 394 A.2d 716 put it in its 
headnote 11: 
Statute which creates liability where 
formerly none existed should receive strict 
construction and is not to be extended, 
modified or enlarged in its scope by mechanics 
of construction. 
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A strict construction of this either inapplicable or 
ambiguous statute requires a determination that it is 
inapplicable in this case. 
Petitioner has asserted that the payment bond requirement 
of U.C.A. 14-1-8 is part of a legislative scheme to protect 
suppliers, artisans and contractors where they are not 
otherwise protected by a mechanics lien because the improvement 
is upon public property, but cites no legislative history in 
support thereof. The statute itself does not suggest that it 
is intended to provide a substitute for a mechanics lien. 
The County's subdivision approval procedures have been in 
place a long time (more than 40 years). They are similar to 
the procedures of almost all political subdivisions according 
to Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, Section 66.05. 
While it may be tempting to modify this longstanding 
practice by judicial fiat, the County respectfully urges that 
the matter should be left to the legislature. If the 
legislature wishes to change the law to require counties to 
require subdividers to provide payment bonds it can easily do 
so. In such event the County can modify its procedures in an 
orderly way and it will not exposed to unintended or at lease 
unexpected vicarious liability in the case of hundreds of 
subdivisions it already approved. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ON THE 
BASIS OF "UNJUST ENRICHMENT" BECAUSE THE COUNTY 
WAS NOT ENRICHED. 
The County accepted the dedication of the offsite 
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improvements in this subdivision on the same basis that it has 
accepted offsite improvements in the hundreds of subdivisions 
that it has approved over the past 50 years. As pointed out in 
the County's appeal brief, such dedications are not gratuitious 
gifts by which the County is enriched, but constitute the 
assumption of additional burden for which it is responsibile 
for care and maintenance. 
It is a well established principle that a landowner 
cannot be enriched by a subcontractor or a materialman who has 
furnished goods or services to a project where the landowner 
has paid the general contractor, regardless of the failure of 
the general contractor to pay the subcontractor or 
materialman. See 62 ALR 3rd 288, "Subcontractors Recovery 
Against Owner". 
In Seeqers v. Spraque, 236 N.W.2d 227 (1975), the trial 
court gave judgment to a subcontractor on quantum meriut for 
work provided on subdivision improvements. The appellate court 
reversed on the basis that there was no privity of contract 
between the subcontractor and the owner of the land, who had 
paid the general contractor. Seeqers clearly enunciates the 
position that quantum meriut does not apply because there is no 
unjust enrichment in such cases. 
The landowner is not enriched because he paid for what he 
got. If the landowner paid the general contractor it would not 
be equitable to require him to pay twice so a subcontractor or 
materialman would not suffer. As between the landowner and the 
subcontractor or materialman, the subcontractor or materialman 
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should absorb the loss because it was he who contracted with 
and relied upon his contract with the general contractor. 
The County urges that while it was not the owner until 
after it agreed to accept the dedication of the street and 
other offsite improvements, the analogy to the owner-general 
contractor and subcontractor is applicable. The County in 
effect paid the general contractor (the subdivider) when the 
County gave the consideration sought from it, that is its 
consent to the dedication. Since the County got only what it's 
subdivision approval procedures comprehended, it did not 
receive a windfall — it cannot be said to have been enriched. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THAT IT IS ENTITLED TO 
ATTORNEY'S FEES BUT THE COUNTY IS NOT, IS 
SPECIOUS. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 14-1-8 (1953) provides as 
follows: 
In any action brought upon either of the bonds 
provided herein, or against the public body failing to 
obtain the delivery of the payment bond, the prevailing 
party, upon each separate cause of action, shall recover 
an attorney's fee to be taxed as costs. 
Plaintiff has brought an action against the public for 
its failure to obtain delivery of the payment bond. 
Accordingly, the prevailing party is entitled to recover an 
attorney's fee to be taxed as costs. 
The statute does not say that in an action brought on the 
bond or on the failure to obtain a bond the statute must 
ultimately be applicable or that the statute must be affirmed. 
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it only provides that if an action is brought, pursuant to its 
provisions, the prevailing party shall recover attorneys fees. 
The statute provides that whichever party prevails in this 
action, is entitled to recover attorneys fees to be taxed as 
costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Salt Lake County's subdivision approval procedure is not 
a contract within the meaning of U.C.A. 14-1-5. It is only an 
approval of the subdividers undertaking to install offsite 
improvements and his guarantee of that undertaking by a 
performance bond. The performance bond is not a contract for 
the construction of a public work or improvement because the 
property belonged to the subdivider at the time performance 
bond was given. 
There is no "awarding" of a contract because "awarding" 
contemplates the conclusion of a successful bidding process 
which is neither relevant, required nor present here. The 
County's subdivision review process is not subject to the 
providions of §14-1-5(2) which requires public bodies to obtain 
payment bonds for contracts awarded for a public work. 
"Unjust Enrichment" is not a basis for plaintiff's 
recovery because the County is not enriched by subdivision 
improvements either in fact or in the sense that it obtained a 
windfall. The County gave the only consideration sought from 
it, its approval of the subdivision. Had that consideration 
been cash, the County could not be asked to pay twice. It 
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should not be asked to pay 
given was different. 
gain because the consideration 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Acting Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: 
GERALD E. NIELSON 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant-
Respondent 
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